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1. Introduction
By testing for their value relevance, this study ex-
amines the usefulness to investors of mandated
disclosures by UK firms of the investor-firm share
of liabilities of equity-accounted associate and
joint venture investees. The study uses UK data for
the period from 1998 to 2003, immediately follow-
ing the date of the introduction by the UK’s
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) of FRS 9:
Associates and Joint Ventures (ASB, 1997).
Motivated in part by concern that single-line eq-
uity accounting was being used as an off-balance-
sheet-financing device which had the effect of
concealing the level of group gearing (ASB,
1996), FRS 9 introduced for the first time strict
thresholds governing disclosures by UK firms of
the investor-firm share of the underlying gross as-
sets and liabilities of equity-accounted investees,
and forced a substantial increase in such disclo-
sures. On the grounds that joint ventures are sub-
ject to joint control by the investor firm whereas
associates are only subject to its significant influ-
ence, FRS 9 also introduced a distinction between
associate investees and joint venture investees, re-
quiring a higher and more prominent degree of dis-
closure in respect of joint ventures. We examine
the value relevance of the FRS 9-mandated disclo-
sures of the liabilities of equity-accounted in-
vestees, which are the amounts by which the net
investments in investees for which disclosures are
made would have to be grossed up to give the in-
vestor-firm share of the gross assets and liabilities
of those investees. In light of the concerns about
concealment of group gearing that partly motivat-
ed the investee-liability disclosure requirements of
FRS 9 and in light of the findings of previous US
research, we predict that the mandated disclosures
are negatively associated with the market value of
equity of the investor firm, and therefore have a
negative coefficient in a value-relevance regres-
sion. In light of the possibility that the creditors of
joint ventures might be more likely than those of
associates to have explicit or implicit recourse to
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the assets of the investor firm and in light of the
greater and more prominent disclosure that FRS 9
required for joint ventures relative to associates,
we also examine whether the value-relevance re-
gression coefficient on investee-liability disclo-
sures is more negative for joint ventures than for
associates. Furthermore, because of the recourse to
the assets of the investor firm conferred by an in-
vestor-firm guarantee of investee-firm obligations,
and in light of the findings of previous US re-
search, we examine whether the value-relevance
regression coefficient on investee-liability disclo-
sures is more negative in the presence of investor-
firm guarantees than in the absence of such
guarantees.
The findings of the study indicate that disclo-
sures of liabilities of equity-accounted investees,
which enable equity-accounted net investments to
be grossed up by financial statement users, are
negatively associated with the market value of eq-
uity of the investor firm. This is consistent with the
concerns about off-balance-sheet financing that
helped motivate the requirement for such disclo-
sures under FRS 9. The study finds little evidence
that the negative valuation impact of liability dis-
closures is stronger for joint venture investees
overall than for associate investees overall, or
stronger for guarantee cases overall than for non-
guarantee cases overall. There is some evidence
that the impact for joint venture guarantee cases is
stronger than that for joint venture non-guarantee
cases and stronger than that for associate guaran-
tee cases.
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. Section 2 gives the background to the study,
outlining relevant issues relating to accounting for
associates and joint ventures and the results of re-
lated research. Section 3 describes the research de-
sign. Section 4 gives details of the data used in the
study. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Background
This section provides background for the empiri-
cal work reported in the study. Subsection 2.1 out-
lines the history of the accounting for investments
in associates and joint ventures in US, internation-
al and UK generally accepted accounting practice
(GAAP), with particular reference to the disclo-
sure of the gross assets and liabilities of equity-ac-
counted investees and to the provisions of the UK
accounting standard FRS 9. Subsection 2.2 out-
lines related research. Subsection 2.3 summarises
the section.
2.1. Accounting for associates and joint ventures
Associate and joint venture investees are each
subject to an important degree of influence by the
investor firm, where the influence falls short of the
control that would classify the investee as a sub-
sidiary of the investor firm. In the case of a joint
venture, the investor firm and one or more other
parties exercise joint control under a contractual
arrangement; in the case of an associate, the in-
vestor firm merely exercises significant influence.1
Some accounting regimes have drawn a distinction
between the two types of investee, and others have
not.
Until the early 1970s, an investment by one firm
in another where the investee firm was not a sub-
sidiary of the investor firm was generally account-
ed for at cost in the balance sheet, and income was
recognised when a dividend was received from the
investee. The inadequacies of such accounting for
what might be vehicles for important activities
motivated the development of a more informative
method of accounting for investee firms over
which the investor firm had significant influence
short of control. Under this method, termed the eq-
uity method, the investee is accounted for in the
investor firm’s balance sheet as a single-line item
comprising cost plus the investor-firm share of the
post-acquisition change in the investee’s equity,
and in its income statement as the investor-firm
share of aggregated components of investee net in-
come. Use of the method was pioneered by the
Royal Dutch Shell group in 1964 (Ernst & Young
LLP, 2001), and was introduced into US GAAP
and UK GAAP in 1971. The relevant US account-
ing standard was APB Opinion No. 18: The equity
method of accounting for investments in common
stock (Accounting Principles Board, 1971), and
the relevant UK accounting standard was initially
SSAP 1: Accounting for Associated Companies
(ASC, 1971). Subsequently, international account-
ing standards incorporated the method in IAS 28:
Investments in Associates (IASB, 2003a) and 
IAS 31: Interests in Joint Ventures, (IASB, 2003b),
which were first issued in 1988 and 1990, respec-
tively.
Concern has been expressed in some quarters
that single-line equity accounting may reflect in-
sufficient information about the activities of in-
vestee firms, a particular concern being that such
accounting could be used to conceal the level of
investor-group debt (Bierman, 1992; ASB, 1994;
ASB, 1996; Crichton, 1996; Johnson and Holgate,
1996). This has led to the development of various
methods for reflecting in the financial statements
of investor firms more detailed information from
the underlying income statements and balance
sheets of equity-accounted investees. These meth-
ods include proportionate consolidation, where the
investor-firm share of investee-firm financial-
268 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 See FRS 9: Associates and Joint Ventures (ASB, 1997),
IAS 28: Investments in Associates (IASB, 2003a) and IAS 31:
Interests in Joint Ventures (IASB, 2003b) for definitions of as-
sociates and joint ventures in UK and international GAAP.
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statement line items is merged with the investor-
firm line items, the expanded equity method,
where the investor-firm share of investee-firm line
items appears in the investor firm’s financial state-
ments but is not merged with the investor-firm line
items, and note disclosures. There has been much
debate about how far along the spectrum from sin-
gle-line equity accounting to proportionate consol-
idation regulators should go with regard to
associates and joint ventures, with single-line eq-
uity accounting being seen by some as reflecting
an inadequate amount of information about impor-
tant activities and proportionate consolidation
being seen by some as implying a greater degree of
control than is actually exercised (ASB, 1994;
Milburn and Chant, 1999). Differences of opinion
have been reflected in differences across regimes
in accounting for associates and joint ventures.
With regard to disclosure of liabilities of equity-
accounted investees, the US’s APB Opinion No. 18
states that, where material, it might be necessary to
disclose information on the assets and liabilities of
the investee firm. Materiality thresholds are not
defined by APB Opinion No. 18, but have been de-
fined for SEC registrants by the SEC’s Regulation
S-X. This requires note disclosure of summarised
information on assets, liabilities and results of op-
erations of equity-accounted investees that exceed
specified materiality thresholds, and the filing of
separate financial statements of equity-accounted
investees that exceed higher materiality thresholds
(Accounting Series Release 302: Separate
Financial Statements Required by Regulation S-X,
SEC, 1981).2 No distinction is drawn between as-
sociates and joint ventures with regard to the re-
quired method of accounting or the required
disclosures.
International GAAP has distinguished between
the method of accounting for associates and the
method of accounting for joint ventures, including
with regard to the way in which investee liabilities
are reflected in investor-firm financial statements.
When first issued in 1988, IAS 28: Investments in
Associates required associates to be accounted for
by the equity method, with no requirement for dis-
closure of liabilities of associates. However, the
current version of the standard, effective for ac-
counting periods beginning on or after 1 January
2005, requires disclosure of summarised financial
information of all associates, including their ag-
gregate assets, liabilities, revenue and net income
(IASB, 2003a). IAS 31: Interests in Joint Ventures
requires that joint ventures be accounted for either
by proportionate consolidation, which is the pre-
ferred method, or by the equity method as for 
associates. However, the IASB has recently sig-
nalled its intention to eliminate the main difference
between IAS 31 and the corresponding US GAAP
provisions by removing the option to account for
joint ventures by proportionate consolidation and
requiring that they be accounted for by the equity
method (IASB, 2007). This will remove a signifi-
cant distinction between the methods of account-
ing for associates and for joint ventures, although
disclosures may continue to be made separately for
each class of investee.
Similar to APB Opinion No. 18, the UK’s SSAP 1
required that, if materially relevant from the per-
spective of the investor firm, information on the
assets and liabilities of an equity-accounted in-
vestee should be disclosed in the investor firm’s fi-
nancial statements. However, no materiality
thresholds were defined and, for the period during
which SSAP 1 was in force, disclosure of such in-
formation by UK firms was rare (ASB, 1997, ap-
pendix 3, paragraph 3). During the 1990s, there
was concern that this might be allowing equity-
accounted investees to be used as a means of con-
cealing debt (ASB, 1994; ASB, 1996; Crichton,
1996; Johnson and Holgate, 1996). Furthermore,
on the grounds that joint ventures and associates
are different in that the former is subject to joint
control by the investor firm whereas the latter is
merely subject to its significant influence, there
was some debate as to whether joint ventures
should be treated differently from associates.
These concerns were reflected in the development
by the UK’s ASB of FRS 9: Associates and Joint
Ventures, which came into effect for accounting
periods ending on or after 23 June 1998. This de-
fined for the first time strict thresholds governing
the disclosure by UK firms of the investor-firm
share of the liabilities of equity-accounted in-
vestees, bringing about a significant increase in
such disclosure. It also introduced a clear distinc-
tion between associates and joint ventures, requir-
ing a higher and more prominent degree of
disclosure for the latter.
The disclosures required by FRS 9 took three
principal forms. First, firms were required to ac-
count for all joint ventures by the gross equity
method, whereby the investor-firm share of the in-
vestee firm’s gross assets and gross liabilities ap-
peared on the face of the investor firm’s balance
sheet and the investor-firm share of the investee
firm’s sales revenue appeared on the face of the in-
vestor firm’s income statement. Second, if the in-
vestor-firm share of one or more designated items
for aggregate associates or for aggregate joint ven-
tures exceeded 15% of the corresponding item for
the investor firm, a 15% materiality disclosure for
that class of investee was required. The designated
items were (i) gross assets, (ii) gross liabilities,
(iii) sales revenue and (iv) the three-year average
of operating profits. If the 15% threshold was ex-
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 269
2 The relevant Regulation S-X rules are 1-02(w), 3-09 and
4-08(g).
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ceeded, the investor firm had to disclose in aggre-
gate its share of the following items of the in-
vestees: sales revenue, fixed assets, current assets,
liabilities due within one year, and liabilities due
after one year. Third, if for any individual associ-
ate or joint venture the investor-firm share of any
of the four designated items exceeded 25% of the
corresponding item for the investor firm, a 25%
materiality disclosure was required. In this case,
the investor firm had to disclose its share of the
following in respect of the individual investee:
sales revenue, profit before tax, taxation, profit
after tax, fixed assets, current assets, liabilities due
within one year, liabilities due after one year.
It is notable that, although it was issued at a time
of increasing support by the ASB for the
International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) harmonisation project, FRS 9 differed
from the then current international accounting
practice, as reflected in IAS 28 and IAS 31, in a
number of significant respects. Areas of difference
included the requirement in FRS 9 to disclose in-
formation about liabilities of associates, at a time
when no such requirement existed in IAS 28, the
lack of any provision within FRS 9 for proportion-
ate consolidation, at a time when IAS 31 strongly
encouraged its use in accounting for joint ventures,
the definition of significant influence, criteria for
exclusion from the requirement to apply equity ac-
counting, the reporting of components of equity-
accounted income, the treatment of loss-making
equity-accounted investees, and the definition of
types of joint venture (Ernst & Young LLP, 2001,
ch. 7, Section 6). It is also notable that the revision
to IAS 28 that post-dated FRS 9, requiring the dis-
closure of associate liabilities for accounting peri-
ods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, and the
proposed revision to IAS 31, requiring joint ven-
tures to be accounted for by the equity method, are
moving international accounting practice with re-
gard to the disclosure of the liabilities of equity-ac-
counted investees closer to the FRS 9 position.3
However, it should also be noted that the proposed
change to IAS 31 runs counter to the path taken by
FRS 9 in one respect, in that it substantially re-
duces the difference between the method used to
account for investments in joint ventures and that
used to account for investments in associates.
2.2. Related research
A number of previous studies examine the use-
fulness to investors of accounting disclosures re-
garding associates and joint ventures, focusing on
their value relevance as measured by association
with market value, on their risk relevance as meas-
ured by association with risk measures, or on their
forecasting relevance as measured by their contri-
bution to the forecasting of accounting numbers.
Motivated by the possibility that US GAAP’s
lack of distinction between associates and joint
ventures might limit the usefulness of US account-
ing data, Soonawalla (2006) examines the rele-
vance to investors of associate and joint venture
disclosures in Canada and the UK for the 
periods 1995–2000 and 1997–2000, respectively.
Relevance is measured both by forecasting rele-
vance and by value relevance. The focus is on the
potential incremental relevance of (i) equity-ac-
counted income disaggregated into associate and
joint venture components, beyond equity-account-
ed income of associates and joint ventures taken
together, (ii) single-line equity-accounted net in-
vestment disaggregated into associate and joint
venture components, beyond the single-line equi-
ty-accounted net investment in associates and joint
ventures taken together, and (iii) joint venture rev-
enues and expenses, beyond joint venture earn-
ings. The study finds evidence that disaggregated
associate and joint venture information is forecast-
ing-relevant and value-relevant beyond aggregate
information, and therefore suggests that failure to
distinguish between associates and joint ventures
may result in the concealment of valuable informa-
tion. It does not consider the effect of investee-lia-
bility disclosures or of investor-firm guarantees.
Lourenço and Dias Curto (2006), using UK data
from 1999 to 2004, report that investors value the
gross assets of joint venture investees differently
from investor-firm gross assets and that they value
the liabilities of joint venture investees differently
from investor-firm liabilities. The study does not
consider associates or the effect of investor-firm
guarantees.
For Canadian firms for the period from 1995 to
2000, Kothavala (2003) examines whether infor-
mation on joint venture investees presented using
proportionate consolidation, which reflects the lia-
bilities of joint venture investees, explains market
risk measures better (is more risk-relevant) than
information based on single-line equity account-
ing, which does not. The study is motivated in part
by suggestions that the use of equity accounting
rather than proportionate consolidation, by failing
to reflect liabilities of investees, may allow those
investees to be used as an off-balance-sheet-fi-
nancing device (Bierman, 1992). The results of the
study are mixed. Accounting numbers based on
proportionate consolidation are more risk-relevant
than those based on single-line equity accounting
when risk is measured using price volatility, but
are less risk-relevant when risk is measured using
270 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 Unlike the international standards, FRS 9 made distinc-
tions with regard to materiality, which resulted in liabilities of
some non-material associates not being disclosed and details
of particularly material associates and joint ventures being dis-
closed individually. Also, it required that disclosures with re-
gard to aggregate joint ventures be made on the face of the
balance sheet using the gross equity method.
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bond ratings. A related study by Stolzfus and Epps
(2005) uses US data for the period from 1996 to
1999 to examine whether accounting data con-
structed as if joint ventures are accounted for by
proportionate consolidation explain risk premia
better than reported accounting data based on the
equity method. The study reports that, although
proportionate consolidation does not dominate eq-
uity accounting in explaining risk premia for all
joint ventures taken together, it does so for joint
ventures where obligations are guaranteed by the
investor firm.
Graham, King and Morrill (2003), using
Canadian data for the period from 1995 to 2001,
find that reported accounting data, in which joint
ventures are accounted for by proportionate con-
solidation, have greater forecasting relevance than
accounting data constructed as if joint ventures are
accounted for by the equity method.
Bauman (2003) uses a sample of 150 US firm-
years for the years 2000 and 2001 to examine the
value relevance to investors in the investor firm of
disclosures of the liabilities of equity-accounted
investees, which he terms off-balance-sheet activ-
ities concealed by the equity method of account-
ing. Because of the possibility that investors in the
investor firm might place a higher weight on in-
vestee-liability disclosures if there is an investor-
firm guarantee of investee-firm obligations, a
distinction is drawn between guarantee cases and
non-guarantee cases. No distinction is drawn be-
tween joint ventures and other equity-accounted
investees. In regression models in which the de-
pendent variable is the market value of equity and
explanatory variables include investee-liability
disclosures, the coefficient on investee-liability
disclosures is negative both in guarantee cases and
in non-guarantee cases, both in 2000 and 2001.
Consistent with investors placing greater weight
on investee-liability disclosures in the presence of
an investor-firm guarantee, the coefficient for
guarantee cases is significant in both years where-
as that for non-guarantee cases is significant in
only one year, and the guarantee coefficient is
lower (more negative) than the non-guarantee co-
efficient in both years.
2.3. Summary
The issues of whether and how to reflect in the
financial statements of investor firms information
about equity-accounted investees have been debat-
ed extensively and have generated a considerable
degree of regulatory activity, some of which is 
ongoing at the time of writing. Prior research has
reported evidence on the value-relevance, risk-rel-
evance and forecasting-relevance of such informa-
tion, and has found that investors view information
about equity-accounted investees differently de-
pending upon whether it relates to associates or to
joint ventures and depending upon whether or not
there is an investor-firm guarantee of investee-firm
obligations. A US study by Bauman (2003) has
found a negative association between the market
value of the investor firm and disclosures of liabil-
ities of equity-accounted investees, with the valu-
ation impact being more pronounced in the
presence of guarantees than in the absence of guar-
antees.
In this study, we use a sample of UK firm-years,
substantially larger than that used in Bauman’s US
study and drawn from the six years immediately
following the major increase in disclosure require-
ments brought about by FRS 9, to examine the
value relevance to investors in the investor firm of
disclosures of liabilities of equity-accounted in-
vestees. We also examine whether this differs be-
tween associates and joint ventures, and whether it
differs between guarantee cases and non-guarantee
cases.
3. Research design
The main objective of this study is to examine
whether disclosures of the investor-firm share of
the liabilities of equity-accounted investees are
value-relevant to investors in the investor firm. In
order to address this objective, the following re-
gression model is estimated:
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 271
4 Market value of equity is measured on an ex-dividend
basis, in order to be consistent with the balance sheet. The ad-
justment by the total return on the firm’s shares for the three
months after the balance sheet date gives a market value meas-
ure which (i) reflects information becoming available in the
three months following the balance sheet date, and (ii) is con-
sistent with the balance sheet with respect to capital changes
that may have occurred in that three-month period.
(1)
where: MVEit is the ex-dividend market value of
equity of the investor firm i at the balance sheet
date t, adjusted by the total return on the firm’s
shares for the three months after that date;4 BVAi,t-1
is the book value of assets of firm i at the previous
balance sheet date t-1, inclusive of its equity-ac-
counted net investment in associates and/or joint
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ventures, and is used to scale all variables in the
model other than dummy variables; ILDit is the
FRS 9-mandated investee-liability disclosure in
respect of material associates and all joint ven-
tures, taken together; BVAit is the book value of as-
sets of firm i at the balance sheet date t, inclusive
of its equity-accounted net investment; BVLit is the
book value of liabilities of firm i at the balance
sheet date t, inclusive of any equity-accounted net-
liability position recorded within provisions; NIit is
the net income of firm i for the period ended at the
balance sheet date t; LOSSit is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if firm i reports a loss in
the period ended at balance-sheet date t and zero
otherwise; Ij,it is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if firm i is from industry group j and
zero otherwise, and allows for differences in the
intercept term across five industry groups (see
below); Ys,it is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if year t is equal to s and zero otherwise,
and allows for differences in the intercept term
across six years (see below); the α, β, δ and η
terms are regression coefficients; and e1,it is a ran-
dom error term. The first digit in each coefficient
subscript refers to the number of the regression
model, of which there are four in total (see below).
The explanatory variable of interest is
ILDit/BVAi,t-1, which is the book-value-scaled in-
vestee-liability disclosure for material associates
and all joint ventures. ILDit is the amount by which
the equity-accounted net investments in the in-
vestees for which disclosures are made would have
to be grossed up to give the investor-firm share of
the gross assets and liabilities of those investees. In
the majority of cases for which a disclosure is
made, the equity-accounted net investment appears
as an asset on the investor firm’s balance sheet. In
such cases, ILDit comprises the investor-firm share
of the total liabilities of the relevant investees. In
some cases a disclosure is made where the equity-
accounted investor-firm share of investee net liabil-
ities is recorded within provisions by the investor
firm. In such cases, ILDit comprises the investor-
firm share of the total assets of the relevant in-
vestees, equal to the investor-firm share of the total
liabilities of the relevant investees less the provi-
sion already recorded by the investor firm in re-
spect of its share of those investees’ net liabilities.5
ILDit does not reflect liabilities of non-material as-
sociates that are not disclosed in the financial state-
ments of the investor firm. In light of the fact that
the requirement for UK firms to make investee-lia-
bility disclosures was partly motivated by concern
that single-line equity accounting was being used
as an off-balance-sheet financing device which had
the effect of concealing the level of group gearing
(ASB, 1996; Crichton, 1996; Johnson and Holgate,
1996), and in light of the US findings of Bauman
(2003), we predict that the coefficient on these
mandated disclosures is negative (β11 < 0).
The other variables on the right-hand side of
model (1) are control variables. We predict a posi-
tive coefficient on book value of assets (β12 > 0) and
a negative coefficient on book value of liabilities
(β13 < 0). The dummy variable for loss cases is in-
cluded because of the evidence in Hayn (1995) that
losses have a lesser impact on firms’ market value
than profits. β14 is the coefficient on net income for
profit cases and β15 is the coefficient on net income
for loss cases less the coefficient on net income for
profit cases; we predict β14 > 0 and β15 < 0. The
control variables used in model (1) also appear in
models (2), (3) and (4) described below, and their
predicted signs in these models are as in model (1).
We also estimate two further regression models,
each of which is an expansion of model (1), in order
to examine the value relevance of different classes of
investee-liability disclosure. We test whether there is
a difference in the value-relevance regression coeffi-
cients (i) between investee-liability disclosures for
associates and investee-liability disclosures for joint
ventures and (ii) between investee-liability disclo-
sures in the absence of investor-firm guarantees of
investee-firm obligations and investee-liability dis-
closures in the presence of such guarantees. In
model (2), investee-liability disclosures are divided
into associate and joint venture components. In
model (3), they are divided according to whether or
not there is an investor-firm guarantee of investee-
firm obligations, without distinguishing between as-
sociates and joint ventures, as in the model used by
Bauman (2003). Models (2) and (3) are as follows:
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5 It is possible that an equity-accounted net-asset position and an equity-accounted net-liability position, recorded within pro-
visions, might appear within the same balance sheet. This is observed in a small number of cases in our data. In such cases, ILDit
comprises both the gross-up of a net-asset position and the gross-up of a net-liability position.
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where: ILDAit and ILDJit are the separate investee-
liability disclosures for firm i’s associates and joint
ventures, respectively; Nit(Git) is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if there is not (if there is)
an investor-firm guarantee of investee-firm obliga-
tions and zero otherwise; and other notation is as
previously defined. Our use of the dummy vari-
ables Nit and Git in model (3) is as in the US study
by Bauman (2003).
Regression coefficients in models (2) and (3)
can be interpreted as follows: β21 is the coefficient
on associate-liability disclosures; β22 is the coeffi-
cient on joint venture-liability disclosures; β31 is
the coefficient on all investee-liability disclosures
taken together where there is no investor-firm
guarantee; β32 is the coefficient on all investee-
liability disclosures taken together where there is 
a guarantee. Consistent with model (1), we predict
a negative coefficient on each of the investee-
liability disclosures in models (2) and (3) (β21 < 0,β22 < 0, β31 < 0, β32 < 0). Because the creditors ofjoint ventures might be more likely than those of
associates to have explicit or implicit recourse to
the assets of the investor firm, we predict that 
the coefficient on joint venture-liability disclo-
sures is lower (more negative) than the correspon-
ding coefficient on associate-liability disclosures
(β22 – β21 < 0). Also, because of the recourse to the
assets of the investor firm conferred by an in-
vestor-firm guarantee of investee-firm obligations
and in light of the US findings of Bauman (2003),
we predict that the coefficient on investee-liability
disclosures is lower (more negative) in the pres-
ence of such guarantees than in the absence of
such guarantees (β32 – β31 < 0).
Finally, we estimate a fourth model that com-
bines the two dimensions considered in (2) and (3).
This allows us to test whether there is a difference
in the value-relevance regression coefficients (i)
between associate non-guarantee cases and associ-
ate guarantee cases and (ii) between joint venture
non-guarantee cases and joint venture guarantee
cases. It also allows us to test whether there is a dif-
ference in the value-relevance regression coeffi-
cients (i) between associate non-guarantee cases
and joint venture non-guarantee cases, and (ii) be-
tween associate guarantee cases and joint venture
guarantee cases. In Model (4) below, ANit (AGit) is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there
is not (if there is) an investor-firm guarantee of as-
sociate obligations and zero otherwise; JNit (JGit)
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
there is not (if there is) an investor-firm guarantee
of joint venture obligations and zero otherwise;
and other notation is as previously defined.
Regression coefficients in model (4) can be in-
terpreted as follows: β41 is the coefficient on asso-
ciate-liability disclosures where there is no
associate guarantee; β42 is the coefficient on asso-
ciate-liability disclosures where there is an associ-
ate guarantee; β43 is the coefficient on joint
venture-liability disclosures where there is no joint
venture guarantee; β44 is the coefficient on joint
venture-liability disclosures where there is a joint
venture guarantee. Consistent with models (1), (2)
and (3), we predict a negative coefficient on 
each of the investee-liability disclosures (β41 < 0,β42 < 0, β43 < 0, β44 < 0). Consistent with model(3), we predict that the coefficients on investee-
liability disclosures are lower (more negative) in
the presence of an investor-firm guarantee than 
in the absence of such a guarantee (β42 – β41 < 0,β44 – β43 < 0). Also, consistent with model (2), we
predict that coefficients on joint venture-liability
disclosures are lower (more negative) than the cor-
responding coefficients on associate-liability dis-
closures (β43 – β41 < 0, β44 – β42 < 0).
In light of the possibility that the relative com-
plexity of model (4) might reduce its power to dis-
tinguish between guaranteed and non-guaranteed
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associates and between guaranteed and non-guar-
anteed joint ventures, we also estimate the model
in two restricted forms: (i) including joint venture
disclosures, but not associate disclosures; (ii) in-
cluding associate disclosures, but not joint venture
disclosures. The relevant coefficients from these
restricted forms of model (4) are very similar to
those from the full model (4), and are not reported.
The restricted forms of the models are referred to
in the account of sensitivity tests given in subsec-
tion 5.2 below.
For the purposes of measuring differences be-
tween coefficients on different classes of investee-
liability disclosure within regression models (2),
(3) and (4) as described above, we re-estimate
each model in an alternative incremental formula-
tion in which each coefficient relating to investee-
liability disclosures is equal to the difference
between a pair of investee-liability-disclosure co-
efficients from the relevant model. The coeffi-
cients from these alternative incremental
formulations of models (2), (3) and (4), and t-sta-
tistics thereon, are reported together with the re-
sults for those models.6
We also estimate each of models (1) to (4) sepa-
rately for each of the six years covered by the
study, exclusive of the dummy variable relating to
the year (Ys,it), and report the results from these
yearly regression models in summary form.
The overall data set is trimmed of outliers by 
removing cases for which MVEit/BVAi,t-1,
ILDit/BVAi,t-1, BVAit/BVAi,t-1, BVLit/BVAi,t-1 and
NIit/BVAi,t-1 fall in the most extreme 2% of the dis-
tribution for that variable. The results from esti-
mating each individual regression model are
reported after deleting cases that meet the DFFITS
cutoff criterion of Belsey, Kuh and Welsch (1980,
p. 28) for that model.7
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study are drawn from the set
of UK listed non-financial firms for which finan-
cial statement and market value data are available
from Extel and Datastream, respectively, for ac-
counting year-ends from 23 June 1998, the manda-
tory adoption date for FRS 9, to 31 December
2003. We identify from balance-sheet data and in-
come-statement data provided by Extel those firm-
years where there is an investment in an associate
and/or a joint venture, including cases where the
firm’s share of associate and/or joint venture net li-
abilities is recorded within provisions. For these
firm-years, we obtain published financial state-
ments from the Thomson Research database or
from the Perfect Information database. From these
financial statements, we identify the firm-years for
which an FRS 9-mandated investee-liability dis-
closure is made, and note in each case the aggre-
gate amount of the investee-liability disclosure,
the amount corresponding to associates and the
amount corresponding to joint ventures. These
amounts are used to construct the investee-liabili-
ty-disclosure regression variables ILD, ILDA, and
ILDJ. (From here on, notation referring to regres-
sion variables omits the subscripts and the scaling
item.) In order to construct the dummy variables in
respect of guarantees (N, G, AN, AG, JN and JG),
we also note from the financial statements whether
there is an investor-firm guarantee of investee-firm
obligations, whether there is a guarantee of associ-
ate obligations and whether there is a guarantee of
joint venture obligations.8 A guarantee is deemed
to exist if the investor firm provides a guarantee in
respect of an investee firm’s liabilities, perform-
ance or any of its contractual obligations.9 In order
to conduct tests of the sensitivity of our results to
the use of more restrictive definitions of guaran-
tees, we also note where there is a guarantee
specifically in respect of an investee firm’s liabili-
ties and, where this is disclosed, we record infor-
mation that is disclosed with regard to the amount
of the guaranteed liabilities. For all firm-years for
which an investee-liability disclosure is made, we
obtain the following items from Extel (Extel item
names in parentheses): book value of assets, de-
noted BVA in regression models (TotalAssets);
book value of liabilities, denoted BVL in regres-
sion models (Debt + Creditors + OtherLiabilities +
OtherLTLiabilities + TotalLiabMisc + (Deferred
Liabilities – DeferredLiabMinorityInterest)); net
income, denoted NI in regression models
(ProfitAfterTax); creditor for dividends, used to
restate the market value of equity to an ex-divi-
dend basis (CreditorsDividendsDue). We also ob-
tain the following items from DATASTREAM:
market value of equity (item: HMV); return in-
dices, used to adjust the market value of equity by
the total return for the three months after the bal-
ance sheet date (data type: RI). For sensitivity tests
referred to below, we also collect from Extel and
Datastream the available financial statement and
market value data for all firms for which no 
274 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 For each of the three models, all results other than those
relating to investee-liability disclosures are identical in both
the initial formulation and the alternative incremental formu-
lation.
7 As indicated below, we test the sensitivity of the results to
an alternative treatment of outliers.
8 In all but one of the cases in which guarantees of equity-
accounted investee-firm obligations are disclosed in the finan-
cial statements, it is stated whether they relate to associates, to
joint ventures or to both. In the remaining case, it is not spec-
ified whether guarantees relate to associates or joint ventures,
and we assume that they relate to both classes of investee.
9 For accounting periods ending on or after 23 March 1999,
the disclosure of guarantees in UK financial statements 
was required by FRS 12: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities
and Contingent Assets (ASB, 1998). For earlier accounting 
periods, it was required by SSAP 18: Accounting for
Contingencies (ASC, 1980).
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investee-liability disclosure is made.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of our data set by
year, broad industry group and class of FRS 9-
mandated investee-liability disclosure. The year
and industry-group breakdowns correspond with
the year and industry-group dummy variables in-
cluded in regression models (1) to (4). There are
7,211 firm-years for which accounting and market
value data are available from Extel and
Datastream. In 2,184 of these firm-years (30% of
7,211), there are associate and/or joint venture in-
vestments. It is notable that the proportion of firms
with investments in associates and/or joint ven-
tures is particularly high in the utilities industry
group.10 In 1,220 of the 2,184 firm-years (56% of
2,184), there is an FRS 9-mandated associate-
and/or joint venture-liability disclosure. Within the
1,220 FRS 9 investee-liability disclosures, there
are 1,078 cases with joint venture gross equity
method disclosures (88% of 1,220) and 246 cases
with associate materiality disclosures (20%). We
do not distinguish between 15% and 25% materi-
ality disclosures. The table also reports for each
FRS 9 disclosure category, the numbers of cases
for which an equity-accounted net liability is re-
ported within the investor firm’s provisions. Of the
1,220 cases for which there is an associate- and/or
joint venture-liability disclosure, there are 184
such cases (15%); of the 1,078 cases for which
there is a joint venture gross equity method disclo-
sure, there are 177 such cases (16%); of the 246
cases for which there is an associate materiality
disclosure, there are 11 such cases (4%). The final
two rows of the table report, respectively, the num-
ber of firm-years in each disclosure category for
which there is an investor-firm guarantee of in-
vestee-firm obligations and, relevant to a sensitiv-
ity test referred to below, the number of firm-years
in each disclosure category for which there is an
investor-firm guarantee of investee-firm liabilities.
Of the 1,220 cases for which there is an associate-
and/or joint venture-liability disclosure, there are
232 cases (19%) where there is a guarantee of as-
sociate and/or joint venture obligations; of the
1,078 cases for which there is a joint venture gross
equity method disclosure, there are 191 cases
where there is a guarantee of joint venture obliga-
tions (18%); of the 246 cases for which there is an
associate materiality disclosure, there are 59 cases
where there is a guarantee of associate obligations
(24%). The corresponding figures for liability
guarantees are 174 (14%), 146 (14%) and 43
(17%), respectively.
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for regression
variables prior to outlier deletion, including non-
zero cases of associate disclosures (ILDAs) and
non-zero cases of joint venture disclosures
(ILDJs), both unscaled and scaled by lagged book
value of assets. The means for associate disclo-
sures are higher than those for joint venture disclo-
sures, which is understandable in light of the fact
that FRS 9 required disclosure of investee liabili-
ties for all joint ventures, but only required disclo-
sure for associates if they were material. The
statistics for the scaled data reveal the existence of
some extreme cases that suggest the need for the
outlier deletion referred to above. It is notable that
some large losses cause the mean of scaled net in-
come to be negative. Also, the median of book-
value-scaled net income is only 4%, reflecting the
relatively high proportion of loss cases in the peri-
od covered by the study.11 Table 3 gives correlation
coefficients between scaled variables used in re-
gression model (1). These statistics are for the data
after deletion of outliers, which reduces the data
set from 1,220 cases to 1,167 cases. It is notable
that the correlation between market value of equi-
ty and investee-liability disclosures overall is very
close to zero (–0.01), and that the correlation be-
tween ILDAs and ILDJs is low (–0.12).
5. Results
5.1. Results from regression models (1), (2), (3)
and (4)
Table 4 reports the results of estimating regres-
sion models (1), (2), (3) and (4). The first column
lists the explanatory variables for the regression
models, excluding the year and industry-group
dummy variables, the second column gives the
predicted signs of the regression coefficients, and
the remaining four columns report the regression
coefficients and related information for each of the
four regression models. The table also reports re-
sults from the alternative incremental formulations
of each of models (2), (3) and (4), which give the
differences between pairs of regression coeffi-
cients on different classes of investee-liability dis-
closure. In each case, the difference reported is
equal to the coefficient on the first-named regres-
sion variable less the coefficient on the second-
named regression variable. Beneath each coefficient
in Table 4, we report the t-statistic and the result of
a significance test on the coefficient. For all coef-
ficients, other than intercept terms, and for all dif-
ferences between coefficients, significance tests
are one-tailed. For the intercept terms, significance
tests are two-tailed. For all regression coefficients,
other than intercept terms, we also report the num-
ber of years out of six for which the coefficient is
of the predicted sign and the number of years out
of six for which it is of the predicted sign and sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 5% level.
276 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
10 Outlier deletion did not result in significant variation
from the distribution across time, industry group and disclo-
sure category reported in Table 1.
11 A loss is reported in about 38% of the 7,211 firm-years
from which the data set is drawn, and in about 26% of the
firm-years used in the study.
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For all four models, all control variables (BVA,
BVL, NI and NI·LOSS) are of the predicted sign
and significantly different from zero at the 1%
level, BVA, NI and NI·LOSS are each of the pre-
dicted sign and significant in all six years, and
BVL is of the predicted sign in four years and sig-
nificant in one year.
Model (1) examines the value relevance of in-
vestee-liability disclosures (ILDs), without distin-
guishing between associate and joint venture cases
and without distinguishing between guarantee and
non-guarantee cases. The coefficient on the ILD is
of the predicted negative sign and is significant.
When the model is estimated separately for each of
the six years from 1998 to 2003, the coefficient is
of the predicted sign in all six years, although it is
significant in only two years. The result suggests
that FRS 9-mandated disclosures, which facilitated
the grossing up of equity-accounted net invest-
ments in associates and joint ventures to reflect the
investor-firm share of the liabilities of those in-
vestees, gave investors a negative signal consistent
with the concerns about concealment of off-bal-
ance-sheet financing reflected in ASB (1994),
ASB (1996), Bierman (1992), Crichton (1996),
Johnson and Holgate (1996) and Milburn and
Chant (1999). This finding is consistent with the
US finding of Bauman (2003).
Model (2) shows whether the regression coeffi-
cient on investee-liability disclosures is lower
(more negative) for joint ventures, over which the
investor firm exercises joint control (regression
variable: ILDJ), than for associates, over which it
merely exercises significant influence (regression
variable: ILDA). The coefficients on associate dis-
closures and on joint venture disclosures are each
of the predicted negative sign; the coefficient on
joint venture disclosures is significant whilst that
for associate disclosures is not. When model (2) is
estimated separately for each year, the coefficients
on associate and joint venture disclosures are each
of the predicted negative sign in five of the six
years, the coefficient on associate disclosures is
never significant, and the coefficient on joint ven-
ture disclosures is significant in only one year. In
that the coefficient for joint ventures is significant
whilst that for associates is not, the overall six-
year findings are consistent with our prediction
that the negative impact of joint venture disclo-
sures is stronger than that of associate disclosures.
However, the coefficient for joint ventures is high-
er (less negative) than that for associates, and in
the yearly regression models the difference be-
tween the coefficients is of the predicted sign in
only two of the six years, and is never significant.
Model (3) shows whether the regression coeffi-
cient on investee-liability disclosures is lower
(more negative) in the presence of investor-firm
guarantees of investee-firm obligations (regression
variable: ILD·G) than in the absence of such guar-
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Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients for regression variables
MVE ILD ILDA ILDJ BVA BVL NI
MVE 1.00
ILD –0.01 1.00
ILDA 0.02 N/A 1.00
ILDJ –0.02 N/A –0.12 1.00
BVA 0.50 0.05 0.00 0.05 1.00
BVL 0.18 0.14 –0.04 0.18 0.52 1.00
NI –0.17 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.11 1.00
Number of cases: 1,167
Note:
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the following regression variables, scaled by previ-
ous-period assets and after outlier deletion as described in the text:
MVE is the ex-dividend market value of equity of the investor firm at its balance sheet date, adjusted by the
total return on the firm’s shares for the three months after that date;
ILD is the FRS 9-mandated investee-liability disclosure in respect of material associates and all joint ven-
tures, taken together;
ILDA is the investee-liability disclosure for associates;
ILDJ is the investee-liability disclosure for joint ventures;
BVA is the book value of assets at the firm’s balance sheet date, inclusive of its equity-accounted net invest-
ment in associates and/or joint ventures;
BVL is the book value of liabilities at the firm’s balance sheet date, inclusive of any equity-accounted net-li-
ability position recorded within provisions;
NI is the net income of the firm for the accounting period ended at the balance sheet date.
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Table 4
Regression results
Regression variable Predicted Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
(scaling item and sign Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
subscripts are (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics)
suppressed in notation) [years: note 3] [years: note 3] [years: note 3] [years: note 3]
Intercept ? –1.06 –1.04 –1.04 –0.99
(–7.46)** (–7.52)** (–7.37)** (–6.86)**
ILD Negative –0.34
(–2.06)*
[6; 2]
ILDA Negative –0.56
(–1.43)
[5; 0]
ILDJ Negative –0.33
(–2.07)*
[5; 1]
ILD·N Negative –0.34
(–1.86)*
[5; 1]
ILD·G Negative –0.37
(–1.47)
[5; 0]
ILDA·AN Negative –1.33
(–4.04)**
[5; 3]
ILDA·AG Negative 0.37
(0.65)
[3; 0]
ILDJ·JN Negative –0.23
(–1.21)
[5; 0]
ILDJ·JG Negative –0.73
(–3.01)**
[6; 0]
BVA Positive 1.50 1.53 1.50 1.46
(9.52)** (10.03)** (9.38)** (8.66)**
[6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6]
BVL Negative –0.33 –0.37 –0.36 –0.35
(–2.44)** (–2.70)** (–2.57)** (–2.49)**
[4; 1] [4; 1] [4; 1] [4; 1]
NI Positive 7.82 7.76 7.87 7.96
(10.53)** (10.54)** (10.62)** (9.78)**
[6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6]
NI·LOSS Negative –10.48 –10.37 –10.47 –10.75
(–10.57)** (–10.63)** (–10.72)** (–10.53)**
[6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6] [6; 6]
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Table 4
Regression results (continued)
Regression variable Predicted Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
(scaling item and sign Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
subscripts are (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics)
suppressed in notation) [years: note 3] [years: note 3] [years: note 3] [years: note 3]
Differences (note 2):
ILDJ less ILDA Negative 0.23
(0.57)
[2; 0]
ILD·G less ILD·N Negative –0.03
(0.12)
[4; 0]
ILDA·AG less ILDA·AN Negative 1.70
(2.70)
[1; 0]
ILDJ·JG less ILDJ·JN Negative –0.50
(–1.90)*
[5; 0]
ILDJ·JN less ILDA·AN Negative 1.10
(3.04)
[1; 0]
ILDJ·JG less ILDA·AG Negative –1.10
(–1.72)*
[5; 1]
Adjusted R-squared 50.6% 50.8% 50.0% 48.5%
Number of cases 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167
Notes:
1. Regression models are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
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Table 4
Regression results (continued)
(4)
where:
MVEit is the ex-dividend market value of equity of the investor firm i at the balance sheet date t, adjust-
ed by the total return on the firm’s shares for the three months after that date;
BVAi,t–1 is the book value of assets of firm i at the previous balance sheet date t-1, inclusive of the equity-
accounted net investment in associates and/or joint ventures, and is used to scale all variables in
the model other than dummy variables;
ILDit is the FRS 9-mandated investee-liability disclosure of the investor firm i at the balance sheet date
t in respect of material associates and all joint ventures, taken together;
ILDAit and are the investee-liability disclosures for associates and joint ventures, respectively;
ILDJit
Nit (Git) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is not (if there is) an investor-firm guarantee
of investee-firm obligations, and zero otherwise;
ANit (AGit) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is not (if there is) an investor-firm guarantee
of associate obligations, and zero otherwise;
JNit (JGit) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is not (if there is) an investor-firm guarantee
of joint venture obligations, and zero otherwise;
BVAit is the book value of assets of firm i at the balance sheet date t, inclusive of the equity-accounted
net investment;
BVLit is the book value of liabilities of firm i at the balance sheet date t, inclusive of any equity-
accounted net-liability position recorded within provisions;
NIit is the net income of firm i for the period ended at the balance sheet date t;
LOSSit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i reports a loss in the period ended at 
balance-sheet date t, and zero otherwise;
Ij,it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i is from industry group j, and zero otherwise;
Ys,it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if t = s, and zero otherwise;
the α, β, δ, and η terms are regression coefficients;
the e terms are random error terms.
2. For each regression variable, the table reports (i) the coefficient estimated from the overall six-year data set
from 1998 to 2003, (ii) the t-statistic thereon (in parentheses), (iii) the result of a significance test on the co-
efficient, where * (**) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level
and (iv) except for intercept coefficients, information on regression coefficients for models estimated sepa-
rately for each year [in square parentheses]. See note 3 for details of the information reported in respect of
yearly regression coefficients. Under the heading of ‘Differences’, the table reports coefficients and related
statistics from alternative incremental formulations of models (2), (3) and (4), where each coefficient relat-
ing to investee-liability disclosures is equal to the difference between a pair of investee-liability-disclosure
coefficients reported above. For each of the alternative incremental formulations of models (2), (3) and (4),
all other coefficients (and t-statistics thereon) are identical to those reported above, and are not separately
reported. All t-statistics are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator
(White, 1980). For the intercept terms, significance tests are two-tailed. For all other coefficients, including
those from the alternative incremental formulations of models (2), (3) and (4), significance tests are one-
tailed, with the predicted sign of each coefficient being given in the second column of the table.
3. The pairs of figures reported in square parentheses relate to the coefficients estimated when regression mod-
els are estimated separately for each of the six years from 1998 to 2003. The first figure of each pair indi-
cates the number of years out of six for which the coefficient is of the predicted sign; the second figure of
each pair indicates the number of years out of six for which the coefficient is of the predicted sign and sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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antees (regression variable: ILD·N). Consistent
with models (1) and (2), both coefficients are of the
predicted negative sign; the coefficient for non-
guarantee cases is significant, whilst that for guar-
antee cases is not. When model (3) is estimated
separately for each year, the coefficients for each
class are each of the predicted negative sign in five
of the six years, the coefficient for non-guarantee
cases is significant in only one year, and the coeffi-
cient for guarantee cases is never significant.
Although the coefficient for guarantee cases is, as
predicted, lower (more negative) than that for non-
guarantee cases, the difference between coeffi-
cients is not significant. In the yearly regression
models, the difference between coefficients is of
the predicted sign in four out of six years, but is
never significant. The lack of evidence in our re-
sults that the negative valuation impact of investee-
liability disclosures is more pronounced in the
presence of investor-firm guarantees contrasts with
the conclusion of the US study by Bauman (2003).
Model (4) combines the two dimensions consid-
ered separately in models (2) and (3), in that it
compares coefficients for investee-liability disclo-
sures in respect of the following four cases: associ-
ate cases in the absence of associate guarantees
(regression variable: ILDA·AN); associate cases in
the presence of associate guarantees (regression
variable: ILDA·AG); joint venture cases in the ab-
sence of joint venture guarantees (regression vari-
able: ILDJ·JN); joint venture cases in the presence
of joint venture guarantees (regression variable:
ILDJ·JG). The coefficients for associate non-guar-
antee cases and for joint venture guarantee cases
are of the predicted negative sign and are signifi-
cant; the coefficient for joint venture non-guarantee
cases is of the predicted negative sign, but is not
significant; the coefficient for associate guarantee
cases is positive, but would not be significantly dif-
ferent from zero in a two-tailed hypothesis test.
With the exception of the coefficient for associate
guarantee cases, these results are consistent with
those for models (2) and (3) with regard to the neg-
ative sign of the coefficients on investee-liability
disclosures. When model (4) is estimated separate-
ly for each year, the coefficients on investee-liabil-
ity disclosures are of the predicted negative sign in
three years for associate guarantee cases, and in
five or six years for the other three classes, but only
in the case of associate non-guarantee disclosures
are any of the yearly regression coefficients signif-
icant (three out of six). With regard to differences
between coefficients, two of our predictions are
supported by the results. The coefficient for joint
venture guarantee cases is more negative than that
for joint venture non-guarantee cases, and the dif-
ference is significant; also, the coefficient for joint
venture guarantee cases is more negative than that
for associate guarantee cases, and the difference is
significant. In both cases, the difference between
coefficients is of the predicted sign in five out of
six years; the difference between coefficients for
joint venture guarantee cases and joint venture non-
guarantee cases is not significant in any year; the
difference between coefficients for joint venture
guarantee cases and associate guarantee cases is
significant in one year only. Our prediction regard-
ing the difference between the coefficients for asso-
ciate guarantee cases and associate non-guarantee
cases and our prediction regarding the difference
between the coefficients for joint venture non-guar-
antee cases and associate non-guarantee cases are
not supported: both differences are opposite to the
predicted sign, and would be significantly different
from zero in a two-tailed hypothesis test.
5.2. Sensitivity tests
We test the sensitivity of our results to a number
of alternative procedures.
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to al-
ternative methods for distinguishing between
guarantee cases and non-guarantee cases. For this
purpose, we repeat our analysis using data in
which guarantee-related dummy variables are de-
fined by reference to guarantees of liabilities,
rather than by reference to guarantees of the broad-
er category of ‘obligations’. We also repeat our
analysis using data in which investee-liability dis-
closures are divided into (i) amounts that we can
identify from notes to the financial statements as
likely to be viewed by readers as guaranteed by the
investor firm (classified as ‘guaranteed’) and (ii)
other amounts (classified as ‘non-guaranteed’).
Furthermore, we allow for the possibility that
recognition within the investor firm’s provisions
of a negative (net-liability) equity-accounted in-
vestment might be interpreted as signalling the ex-
istence of an implicit guarantee of the investee’s
obligations. In order to do this, we repeat our
analysis using data in which investee-liability dis-
closures in respect of all net-liability investees are
treated as guaranteed, regardless of whether a
guarantee is explicitly mentioned in the financial
statements of the investor firm.12
Second, because comparability of the value rele-
vance of associate-liability disclosures and joint
venture-liability disclosures might be reduced due
282 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
12 This treatment of disclosures in respect of net-liability in-
vestees that are reflected within provisions will tend to over-
state the extent of implicit guarantees under FRS 9. FRS 9
required that equity-accounted net liabilities should only be
omitted from the investor firm’s balance sheet if the investor
firm had irreversibly withdrawn from its relationship with the
investee (ASB, 1997, paragraphs 44–45). If the provisions had
been recorded under IAS 28, the treatment in our sensitivity
test would be clearly justified, since IAS 28 requires that net-
liability cases should only appear on the investor firm’s bal-
ance sheet if the investor firm has entered into an obligation
with respect to the investee (IASB, 2003a, paragraphs 29–30). 
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to the fact that FRS 9 required disclosures for all
joint ventures but only for material associates, the
analysis is repeated using only those disclosures
that relate to material associates and material joint
ventures.
Third, the analysis is repeated using only those
cases for which there is both an associate disclo-
sure and a joint venture disclosure.
Fourth, the analysis is repeated including (i) all
cases for which there is an associate and/or joint
venture investment, regardless of whether an in-
vestee-liability disclosure is made, and (ii) all
cases for which accounting and market value data
are available from Extel and Datastream, respec-
tively, regardless of whether there is an equity-ac-
counted investment.
Fifth, as mentioned earlier, in light of the rela-
tively complex nature of model (4), the model is
estimated in two restricted forms: (i) including
joint venture disclosures, but not associate disclo-
sures; (ii) including associate disclosures, but not
joint venture disclosures.
Finally, the analysis is repeated after deleting as
outliers 1% of extreme cases, instead of 2% of
cases.
None of these alternative procedures gives re-
sults that differ materially from those reported in
Table 4.
5.3. Summary of results
Overall, our results suggest that FRS9-mandated
investee-liability disclosures had a negative valua-
tion impact. The value-relevance regression coef-
ficient on all investee-liability disclosures taken
together is negative and significant. Seven of the
eight value-relevance regression coefficients for
particular classes of investee-liability disclosures
are negative, although only four of these are sig-
nificant. The negative sign of the coefficients on
investee-liability disclosures is consistent with the
US findings of Bauman (2003). Contrary to our
predictions, we do not find convincing evidence
that joint venture disclosures overall have a
stronger negative valuation impact than associate
disclosures overall or that disclosures in guarantee
cases overall have a stronger negative valuation
impact than disclosures in non-guarantee cases
overall. However, consistent with our predictions,
we do find evidence that disclosures for joint ven-
ture guarantee cases have stronger negative value
relevance than those for joint venture non-guaran-
tee cases and those for associate guarantee cases.
Our results should be viewed in light of the fact
that, although our yearly value-relevance regres-
sion coefficients on investee-liability disclosures
are of negative sign in 83% of cases (45 out of 54),
they are significant in only 13% of cases (7 out of
54), but the weaker results from our yearly regres-
sion models may be due in part to the relatively
small sample sizes available for individual years.
A feature of our results is the lack of convincing
evidence of a difference between the value rele-
vance of investee-liability disclosures for joint
ventures and those for associates. This could indi-
cate that there is limited economic difference be-
tween joint ventures and associates, at least with
regard to information on investee indebtedness
disclosed in financial statements. We should also
bear in mind the possibility that the distinction be-
tween the two types of investee entity may have
been blurred because investor firms may have
structured investments as associates rather than as
joint ventures in order to avoid increased disclo-
sure. This issue is not addressed in this study.
However, the question of whether the existence of
different accounting and disclosure requirements
for different classes of investee may have influ-
enced managers’ choices with regard to how in-
vestments are structured would be a worthwhile
subject for further research.
6. Conclusion
The issues of whether and how to reflect in in-
vestor-firm financial statements information about
the liabilities of equity-accounted investees have
given rise to some debate and to some differences
in practice across GAAP regimes. This study ex-
amines the value relevance of disclosures mandat-
ed by the UK accounting standard FRS 9:
Associates and Joint Ventures (ASB, 1997) regard-
ing the investor-firm share of liabilities of equity-
accounted associates and joint ventures. FRS 9
defined for the first time strict thresholds govern-
ing such disclosure by UK investor firms, and
brought about a significant increase in disclosure.
In light of the concerns about concealment of
group gearing that partly motivated the investee-li-
ability disclosure requirements of FRS 9, and the
findings of previous US research, we predict that
the mandated disclosures are negatively associated
with the market value of equity of the investor
firm. In light of the distinction that FRS 9 drew be-
tween joint ventures and associates because the
former are subject to the investor firm’s joint con-
trol whereas the latter are merely subject to its sig-
nificant influence, and the possibility that the
creditors of joint ventures might be more likely
than those of associates to have explicit or implic-
it recourse to the assets of the investor firm, the
study also examines whether the negative valua-
tion impact of investee-liability disclosures is
more pronounced for joint ventures than for asso-
ciates. In light of findings of previous US research,
it also examines whether the negative valuation
impact of investee-liability disclosures is more
pronounced in the presence of investor-firm guar-
antees of investee-firm obligations than in the ab-
sence of such guarantees.
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Subject to caveats regarding the significance of
results from yearly regression models, our results
confirm the prior US finding of Bauman (2003) 
regarding the negative valuation impact of disclo-
sures of the liabilities of equity-accounted in-
vestees. From the perspective of the accounting
regulator, this evidence provides some confirma-
tion of the value to investors of disclosures about
liabilities of equity-accounted investees, and sug-
gests that such disclosures are seen as negative 
signals, consistent with the concerns about off-
balance-sheet financing that partly motivated the
requirements for such disclosures. These results
are supportive of revisions made to IAS 28:
Investments in Associates (IASB, 2003a), which
post-dated FRS 9 and which have required disclo-
sure of associate liabilities for accounting periods
beginning on or after 1 January 2005.
Our results relating to the distinction between
joint ventures and associates have some relevance
in light of the proposed revision of IAS 31:
Interests in Joint Ventures (IASB, 2003b), which
would eliminate the use of proportionate consoli-
dation and require that joint ventures be accounted
for by the equity method, as is required for associ-
ates. There is some evidence in our study that the
value-relevance of investee-liability disclosures is
more pronounced for guaranteed joint venture lia-
bilities than for guaranteed associate liabilities.
However, the lack of overall evidence of a differ-
ence between the value relevance of investee-
liability disclosures for joint ventures and those 
for associates could indicate that there is limited
economic difference between joint ventures and
associates, at least with regard to information on
investee indebtedness disclosed in financial state-
ments, and we would not claim to report strong ev-
idence of the need for different treatments for joint
venture liabilities and associate liabilities. In any
event, provided that the liabilities of equity-ac-
counted joint ventures are required to be disclosed
by way of note, separately from those of associ-
ates, the removal of the proportionate consolida-
tion option in international GAAP would not
significantly reduce the quality of information re-
garding the liabilities of joint ventures.
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